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Abstract
The paradox of Wigners friend challenges the objectivity of quantum the-
ory. A pragmatist interpretation can meet this challenge by judicious appeal
to decoherence. Quantum theory provides situated agents with resources for
predicting and explaining what happens in the physical world not conscious
observations of it. Even in bizarre Wigners friend scenarios, di¤erently situ-
ated agents agree on the objective content of physical magnitude statements,
while normally Quantum Darwinism permits agents equal observational access
to their truth. Quantum theory has nothing to say about conscious experiences.
But it does prompt us to reexamine the signicance of everyday claims about
the physical world.
1 Introduction
Wigner (1967) presented his friend paradox to motivate the view that conscious-
ness has a special role to play in quantum theory by collapsing the quantum
state. In a more recent discussion, DEspagnat (2005) argued that a consistent
treatment of the Wigners friend scenario may be given (without collapse) if
the descriptive content underlying quantum theory is restricted to probabilistic
predictions owing from the Born Rule, but only if these concern conscious ex-
periences of observers. In contrast, a recent pragmatist proposal (Healey 2012)
views quantum theory as a resource for situated agents (rather than observers)
with no requirement that these be conscious.1 If quantum theory is interpreted
along these pragmatist lines, Wigners friend scenarios may be treated consis-
tently and without ambiguity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes some distinct notions of
objectivity relevant to quantum theory. Section 3 recalls the paradox of Wigners
friend. The pragmatist interpretation of Healey (2012) is sketched in section 4.
Section 5 shows how this resolves the paradox while securing the objectivity
of description in quantum theory. Section 6 addresses a more general worry
about objectivity of description. Section 7 relates the foregoing treatment of
objectivity to a recent suggestion (Ollivier et al. 2004) that objective properties
emerge from subjective quantum states through Quantum Darwinism. While
1As far as we know, conscious humans are the only agents currently able to avail themselves
of this resource. But this view admits the possibility that non-human, or even non-conscious,
situated agents may come to use quantum theory.
a pragmatist view of quantum theory secures the objectivity of a claim about
the values of physical magnitudes, it recognizes that its content depends on the
environmental context. The conclusion points out that this involves a subtle
change in our understanding of how even the familiar language of everyday
a¤airs, including laboratory procedures, assigns objective propertiesbeables
to objects (Bell 2004).
2 Objectivity
Objectivity (and its polar opposite, subjectivity) can mean many things. Dreams
are a paradigm of subjectivity. The subject matter of a dream is not objective:
a dream does not portray what really happens. The mode of presentation is
not objective: this subject matter is accessible only to the dreamer. What is
presented as well as its mode of presentation strongly depends on the specic as
well as the general features of the dreamer her individual physiology, psychol-
ogy and prior experiences as well as her humanity (Dick 1968). By contrast,
a description or mathematical representation in physics has an objective sub-
ject matter if its content represents physical reality, and an objective mode of
presentation to the extent that how this is represented does not depend on the
specic and general features of the one whose representation it is.
The prominence of notions of observation or measurement in standard formu-
lations of quantum theory raises concerns about the objectivity of descriptions
in that theory. If the Born Rule is understood to yield probabilities just for
results of observations/measurements then one can question the objectivity of
these results. The orthodox view that a quantum measurement cannot be un-
derstood generally as revealing the value of the measured observable has now
been amply supported by "no-go" theorems (Gleason 1957, Kochen and Specker
1967, Fine 1982, Mermin 1993). This challenges the objectivity of subject mat-
ter in a description of the result of an observation. One can respond to this
challenge by proposing an analysis of observation/measurement as an objective
physical process. But the assumption that quantum theory can itself represent
this process leads to the notorious quantum measurement problem (Fine 1970,
Brown 1986, Bassi and Ghirardi 2000). The alternative of characterizing obser-
vation independently as a physical interaction with a macroscopic apparatus,
and/or involving irreversible amplication involves the "shifty split" between
quantum and classical descriptions justiably criticized by Bell (2004).
With his keen appreciation of how di¢ cult it is to provide a satisfactory phys-
ical characterization of observation/measurement in quantum theory, Wigner
came to think that a measurement in quantum theory occurs just when a con-
scious observer becomes aware of a result. On this view, the Born Rule yields
probabilities only for alternative conscious experiences. It thereby threatens
both the objectivity of the subject matter of description in quantum theory
and the objectivity of its mode of presentation. Quantum theory, it seems, is
then concerned to predict and (perhaps) explain "communicable human expe-
rience. In other words...the set of all the impressions human minds may have
and communicate to others." (DEspagnat 2005)2
Suppose one so restricts the scope of quantum theory. Then the descriptive
claims to which the Born Rule attaches probabilities fail to be objective in
several respects:
(1) Their subject matter is not a physical reality independent of our experi-
ences.
(2) Their mode of presentation depends on the individual consciousness.
(3) This consciousness is generically human.3
One could seek to restore this third respect of objectivity by generalizing beyond
humans to observers capable of any su¢ ciently sophisticated form of conscious
experience. But since consciousness is not well understood (especially in non-
humans) to do so would further obscure the content of these descriptive claims,
which would still fail to be objective in either of the rst two respects.
While the quantum theory of environmental decoherence does not by itself
resolve the quantum measurement problem (DEspagnat 1990, Bub 1997, Adler
2000), many believe it may contribute to a resolution within some appropriate
interpretative framework. Such a framework appears in (Healey 2012), and is
sketched in section 4 below. From the present perspective, the key interpretative
proposal is to remove any talk of observation or measurement from a formulation
2The Wigners friend scenario casts doubt even on such communicability. DEspagnats
paper seeks to relieve this doubt.
3 In the course of the paper I will distinguish further aspects of objectivity. The notion
is many-faceted so it is best not to begin by dening objectivity in an attempt to encompass
them all.
of the Born Rule by taking this to generate a function with the mathematical
features of a probability measure over claims that simply describe values of
magnitudes rather than results of observing them. The "no-go" theorems block
this approach if one further assumes that every claim over which these functions
are dened always has a well-dened content, so an agent should believe it to
a degree specied by its Born "probability"4 to avoid refutation by statistics of
actual observations. But suppose, on the other hand, that how much signicance
attaches to a claim about a system depends on the extent of environmental
decoherence su¤ered by its quantum state. Then the numbers yielded by the
Born rule have the import of genuine probabilities only for signicant claims:
Born rule "probabilities" for claims lacking such signicance are not reected
in (actual or hypothetical) frequencies, and should not guide an agents degrees
of belief in these insignicant claims.
On this view any reference to observation or measurement has been elimi-
nated from the Born rule as well as other basic principles of quantum theory,
and so there is no reason to suppose that descriptive claims that arise in quan-
tum theory are subjective in any of the respects (1)-(3) noted above. But there
is a fourth aspect of objectivity to consider, as the following quote makes clear:
"A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on
the specics of the individuals makeup and position in the world, or on the
4"Probability" rather than probability, because here the function has the mathematical
character of a probability measure but the theorems show its values cannot play probabilitys
requisite practical and/or epistemic role.
character of the particular type of creature that he is." (Nagel 1986)
If the signicance for an agent of a descriptive claim about the value of a
magnitude depends on how that agent is situated in the world, then that claim
may lack a kind of objectivity. Di¤erently positioned agents could understand
the claim di¤erently: they may come to a no-fault disagreement about whether
it is true, or even meaningful. The interpretation of Healey (2012) faces such a
challenge to its understanding of the objectivity of descriptive claims in quantum
theory a challenge that is highlighted by the Wigners friend scenario, as we
shall see.
3 Wigners Friend
The paradox of Wigners friend presents a challenge to the objectivity of
physical description within quantum theory. To set up the paradox, imag-
ine Schrödingers cat (and associated diabolical device) replaced by a human
experimenter (Wigners friend, John) who records in a device D the result of
a quantum measurement of observable Q he performs on a system s inside his
isolated laboratory.5 Eugene and John both agree that the quantum state of s
is initially (at time t i) a non-trivial superposition of eigenstates of Q^. Let C be
5To call the laboratory isolated, is to require by at the absence of any decohering
interactions with its external environment. So we are talking of a ridiculously impractical
Gedankenexperiment, as Schrödinger explicitly said he was when describing his cat scenario.
The point of doing so is to show how this raises a problem for one view of quantum theory
and then to explain why this problem does not arise on the pragmatist view of Healey (2012).
the claim that the value of a recording magnitude M on D is m at time tf after
s has interacted with D. John looks at D at tf and makes claim C. On the basis
of this observation, he assigns a collapsed quantum state to s+D.6 Environmen-
tal interactions within the laboratory rapidly entangle this collapsed state with
the state of everything else in the laboratory. But the total quantum state j Ji
of the enormously complex system composed of John, D and everything else
inside the laboratory will continue to reect the collapse onto an eigenstate of
M^ induced by Johns measurement.
Meanwhile Eugene, who has remained outside the laboratory, assigns a state
j Ei to the enormously complex system composed of John, D and everything
else inside the laboratory, based on all the information about the properties of
systems to which he has access in this situation. For Eugene, Johns measure-
ment involves purely unitary interactions between s and D, between D and
John, and between all these systems and the rest of the laboratory. Accord-
ingly, he evolves the state j Ei unitarily, with no collapse from t i to tf . Since
j J(tf )i 6= j E(tf )i, Johns and Eugenes quantum states di¤er after Johns
measurement but before Eugene enters the laboratory. As these states are usu-
ally understood, j J(tf )i represents a denite result of Johns measurement
(recorded by the state of D, Johns memory, etc.) while j E(tf )i excludes any
6He does so in accordance with a view of quantum states due to Dirac and von Neu-
mann. While himself subscribing to this orthodoxy, Wigner maintained that it is only Johns
consciousness that induces the collapse. I use the word collapse to refer to a hypothetical
physical change in the properties of a system supposedly represented by a reassignment of its
quantum state.
such denite result and its traces. To retain its internal consistency, this view of
quantum states must deny the objectivity of Johns measurement result, since
di¤erently situated agents (John and Eugene) disagree about whether C is true
at tf .
On any view of quantum states, since j E(tf )i is an eigenstate of some ex-
tremely complex observable O on the entire laboratory system, Eugene could
in principle (though certainly not in practice) distinguish between j J(tf )i and
j E(tf )i by creating a suitable ensemble of identical laboratory systems and
measuring O on each system: j E(tf )i would give the same result on each,
while j J(tf )i would almost certainly yield a statistical spread of di¤erent re-
sults. This same procedure would also, in principle, enable Eugene to distinguish
between j E(tf )i and the mixed state J(tf ) =
P
i jcij2 j J(tf )ii h J(tf )ji Eu-
gene may assign to reect his ignorance of the result of Johns measurement.7
Wigners own way of resolving this paradox was to give consciousness (and
only consciousness) the distinctive physical role of inducing collapse of the quan-
tum state onto an eigenstate of the measured observable. For him, it was
the interaction with Johns consciousness that produced a discontinuous phys-
ical change inside the laboratory, resulting in the nal state j J(tf )i and not
j E(tf )i. Such a change would be detectable in principle in the Wigners friend
scenario, though quite impossible to detect in practice. I will o¤er a di¤erent
7To keep things simple, here I assume John made an ideal measurement on the stateP
ici j'ii, thereby collapsing the state of s+D onto some eigenstate j'ki jki with probability
jckj2.
resolution involving no such collapse. This involves the di¤erent understanding
of quantum states described in the next section.
4 A Pragmatist Interpretation
In quantum theory as it is usually formulated, theoretical models involve quan-
tum states and operators corresponding to observables (including the Hamil-
tonian and/or Lagrangian) and (solutions to) the Schrödinger equation and rel-
ativistic generalizations. But there is still no agreement as to how, or whether,
any of these model elements represent physical magnitudes.
According to Healey (2012), operators, quantum states and their evo-
lution neither represent nor describe the condition or behavior of a physical
system to which they pertain. It follows that these novel elements appearing
in quantum models cannot be used to make claims about how the behavior of
that system is responsible for any physical phenomenon. But quantum theory
nevertheless helps us to predict and explain an extraordinary variety of physical
phenomena using representational resources from outside of quantum theory. It
can do this because of the way in which theoretical models involving quantum
states, operators, and the Schrödinger equation are applied. There are principles
for using these models to guide one in making descriptive claims and forming
representational beliefs about physical systems to which such models may be
applied but which these models do not themselves describe or represent.
The dispute as to whether quantum theory provides a complete descrip-
tion of a physical system presupposes that quantum states at least provide a
partial description or representation of the physical properties of systems to
which they are assigned. Rejecting this presupposition may seem tantamount
to regarding the quantum state as merely a symbolic device for calculating prob-
abilities of possible measurement outcomes on these systems. But this is not
so. Assignment of a quantum state may be viewed as merely the rst step in a
procedure that licenses a user of quantum theory to express claims about phys-
ical systems in descriptive language and then warrants that user in adopting
appropriate epistemic attitudes toward these claims. The language in which
such claims are expressed is not the language of quantum states or operators,
and the claims are not about probabilities or measurement results: they are
about the values of magnitudes on physical systems. That is why Healey (2012)
refers to such claims as NQMCs Non-Quantum Magnitude Claims. Here are
some typical examples of NQMCs:
A helium atom with energy  24:6 electron volts has zero angular
momentum.
Silver atoms emerging from a Stern-Gerlach device each have angular-
momentum component either +~/2 or  ~/2 in the z -direction.
The fourth photon will strike the left-hand side of the screen.
When a constant voltage V is applied across a Josephson junction,
an alternating current I with frequency 2(e/h)V ows across the
junction.
(Notice that two of these non-quantum claims are stated in terms of Plancks
constant.) For contrast, here are some quantum claims which do not describe
the physical properties of systems to which they pertain8 :
The expectation value of angular momentum for atomic helium in
the ground state is 0.
Integral-spin systems have symmetric quantum states, while half-
integral-spin systems have antisymmetric quantum states.
The probability that a tritium nucleus will decay in 12.3 years is 12 .
After one photon from the polarization-entangled Bell state j+> is
found to be horizontally polarized, the other photon has polarization
state jH>.
This is not to say that quantum mechanical claims like these lack truth-
values each is appropriately evaluated as true (though in the case of the last
claim that evaluation is critically dependent on the context relative to which it is
made).9 But the function of such claims is not to describe or represent properties
of physical systems: it is to o¤er authoritative advice to a physically situated
8 In the pragmatist interpretation of Healey (2012), a quantum claim is not to be distin-
guished from an NQMC by the fact that it concerns some wholly new dynamical variable.
Spin is still a form of angular momentum, even though quantum theory uses non-commuting
spin-component operators in its models and severely restricts entitlement to claims about
spin-component values and their relation to NQMCs about position and momentum.
9To call these claims true is, in part, to say that they command the assent of all rational,
well-informed agents. Price (2003) is one pragmatists attempt to say what more is involved.
A distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive claims is not to be drawn solely in terms
agent on the content and credibility of NQMCs concerning them. Quantum
theory contributes indirectly to our predictive and explanatory projects.
A quantum state and the consequent Born probabilities can be assigned
to a system only relative to the physical situation of an (actual or hypothetical)
agent for whom these assignments would yield good epistemic advice. What
one agent should believe may be quite di¤erent from what another agent in a
di¤erent physical, and therefore epistemic, situation should nd credible. This
relational character of quantum states and Born probabilities does not make
these subjective, and it may be neglected whenever users of quantum theory nd
themselves in relevantly similar physical situations. NQMCs are not relational
in this way: Their truth-values do not depend on the physical situation of any
actual or hypothetical agent.
On this pragmatist understanding, a quantum state guides an agent
in two di¤erent ways. The agent requires guidance in assessing the content of
NQMCs about systems of interest in a context where such claims may arise. It is
of the function of a claim, and can only be contextual for a pragmatist. A doctors claim that
his patient should quit smoking and exercise more may be considered true while its function
is to prescribe a course of action. Interpreting quantum theory sets up a context in which
it is appropriate to grant the descriptive function of NQMCs while assessing the function of
quantum claims with respect to them. While that function is not to describe or represent
quantum systems, the successful performance of its function is what warrants assent to a
quantum claim. There is a semantically minimal sense in which a quantum claim true of a
system now corresponds to reality. But its truth is grounded, not in some present quantum
property of this system, but rather in true NQMCs, many if not all of which say what other
systems were or will be like.
often said that assignment of a value to an observable on a system is meaningful
only in the presence of some apparatus capable of measuring the value of that
observable. But some account of meaning must be o¤ered in support of this
assertion, and the extreme operationist account that is most naturally associated
with it would be unacceptably vague even if it were otherwise defensible. Exactly
what counts as the presence of an apparatus capable of measuring the value of
an observable?
Contemporary pragmatist approaches to meaning have the resources
to provide a better account of the signicance of an NQMC about a system,
as entertained by an agent, in a context in which that system features. A
pragmatist like Brandom (1994, 2000) takes the content of any claim to be
articulated by the material inferences (practical as well as theoretical) in which it
may gure as premise or conclusion. These inferences may vary with the context
in which a claim arises, so the content of the claim depends on that context. The
quantum state modulates the content of NQMCs about a system by specifying
the context in which they arise. The context may be specied by the nature
and degree of environmental decoherence su¤ered by this quantum state. An
NQMC about a system when the quantum state has extensively decohered in
a basis of eigenstates of the operator corresponding to that magnitude on the
system has a correspondingly well-dened meaning: a rich content accrues to it
via the large variety of material inferences that may legitimately be drawn to
and from the NQMC in that context. Call an NQMC canonical if it is of the
form M 2 :
Magnitude M has value in Borel set  of real numbers.
Only when the content of a canonical NQMC is su¢ ciently well articulated
in this way is it appropriate to apply the Born Rule to assign a probability to
that claim.
For example, a claim that an electron passed unobservably through a par-
ticular slit in a di¤raction grating gures as premise or conclusion in almost
no interesting material inferences, and so is very poorly articulated. This is a
consequence of the fact that, in the absence of interactions capable of revealing
its presence, the quantum state of the electron su¤ers negligible decoherence
through entanglement with the environment in the interferometer. With no
signicant decoherence between di¤erent spatially localized quantum states, an
agent has only a very limited license to use claims about the electrons position.
In particular, the license is so limited that little may legitimately be inferred
from such claims. But the subsequent interaction with detectors at the screen
involves massive environmentally induced decoherence of the initial quantum
state of electron plus detector, permitting a high degree of articulation of the
content of claims about the value of a magnitude on the detector taken to record
the position of the electron at the screen. The decohered quantum state then
grants an agent a wide license to formulate and use NQMCs about records of
the electrons position at the screen. This illustrates the rst way in which a
quantum state guides an agent by advising her on the extent of her license to
use particular NQMCs by informing her of the nature and degree of that states
environmental decoherence.
With a su¢ ciently extended license, an agent may now apply the Born
Rule to evaluate the probability of each licensed canonical NQMC using the
appropriate quantum state. In the example, this will be the initial superposed
state of the electron. Lacking more direct observational information, after as-
signing the quantum state of a system appropriate to her physical situation, an
agent should adjust her degrees of belief in licensed NQMCs pertaining to that
system so they match the probabilities of NQMCs specied by the Born Rule.
This is the second way in which a quantum state guides an agent.
An agent should accept this twofold guidance by the quantum state
appropriate for one in her physical situation, since by doing so she is able suc-
cessfully to predict and explain phenomena in a wide variety of circumstances.
But according to Healey (2012) she need not, and should not, assume that this
quantum state describes or represents the condition or behavior of a system to
which she ascribes it. The interpretation does not deny that a particular process
occurs when a physical system interacts with its physical environment. But it
does deny that the function of a model of decoherence of a systems quantum
state is to represent what happens to that system in this process: that is the
sense in which decoherence is not itself a physical process. An agent appeals to
the quantum theory of decoherence to decide what to think about the content
and credibility of NQMCs about a physical system, not to describe the evolving
properties of a system whose quantum state decoheres.
5 Paradox Resolved
Consider the situation of Wigners friend John inside his isolated laboratory.
According to the pragmatist interpretation sketched in the previous section,
John is licensed by decoherence to apply the Born Rule to the superposed state
of s and advised by quantum theory to adjust his credences in claims about
the value of recording magnitude M on D at time tf so they match the corre-
sponding Born probabilities. This is because the phase of the quantum state
he consequently assigned to s+D immediately before has, by tf , been robustly
delocalized into the environment inside his laboratory. He is then warranted by
his own direct observation of D in making the signicant claim C that the value
of M on D is m.
Meanwhile Eugene, who has remained outside the laboratory, assigns state
j Ei to the enormously complex system composed of John, D and everything
else in the laboratory. By assumption, the phase of state j Ei has not been
delocalized into its environment by tf , so this state does not license Eugene to
entertain any signicant claim about the value of a magnitude on the laboratory
or anything in it. In this situation, Eugene should not apply the Born Rule to
j Ei and adjust any of his credences accordingly. If and only if the laboratory
ceases to be isolated so as to delocalize the phase of j Ei (as Eugene subse-
quently enters it, for example) would Eugene be in a position to apply the Born
Rule to signicant claims about the laboratory or traces it leaves in an external
recording device (such as his own brain).
Recall the di¢ culties presented by the Wigners friend scenario noted in
section 3:
1) As these states are usually understood, j J(tf )i represents a denite result
of Johns measurement (recorded by the state of D, Johns memory, etc.) while
j E(tf )i excludes any such denite result and traces of it in Johns laboratory.
2) On any view of quantum states, since j E(tf )i is an eigenstate of some
extremely complex observable O on the entire laboratory system, Eugene could
in principle (though certainly not in practice) distinguish between j E(tf )i and
j J(tf )i (or J(tf )) by creating a suitable ensemble of identical laboratory sys-
tems and measuring O on each system.
These di¢ culties present a challenge to the objectivity of physical description
here. (1) apparently implies that, by assigning di¤erent quantum states to the
contents of Johns laboratory at tf , John and Eugene come to disagree about the
truth-value of the descriptive claim C. If so, they can both be right only if that
truth-value is relative to the physical situation of the agent making it in conict
with the fourth aspect of objectivity noted in section 2. But (2) shows that such
relativization of truth-value to agent-situation still leaves it unclear how John
and Eugene can consistently apply quantum theory here. Independent of the
practicality of Eugenes discriminatory measurements, j E(tf )i and j J(tf )i (or
J(tf )) are distinct states, yielding incompatible Born probabilities concerning
the possible values of certain magnitudes on the entire laboratory. Relativization
of the laboratorys quantum state to the situations of Eugene, John, respectively
leaves it ambiguous on which of these states quantum theory advises them to
base their expectations about these possible values.
The pragmatist of the previous section responds to this challenge, rst by
rejecting the usual understanding of the states j J(tf )i, j E(tf )i. For her,
neither state has the function of representing the physical properties of Johns
laboratory or anything in it. Since neither state represents anything bearing
on the result of Johns measurement (e.g. whether or not C is true at tf ),
assignment of both states to Johns laboratory at the same time could not lead
John and Eugene to assign (apparently) conicting truth-values to C.
But John and Eugene each assume that John will perform a measurement
on s by interacting s appropriately with D, and that the environment inside
the laboratory will decohere the state of s+D in Ds "pointer basis" (without
inducing any physical collapse in that state). So both John and Eugene are
licensed to entertain claim C and (beforehand) to set their credences for C at
tf equal to the corresponding Born Rule probability. This implies they agree
that C has a truth-value at tf . But while Eugene remains outside the laboratory,
only John is in a position to look at D at and after tf and so determine what
that truth-value is. This secures the objectivity of the description C, in the sense
that di¤erently positioned agents (John and Eugene, in this case) agree that C
has a truth-value after tf , and do not disagree about what that truth-value is.
At this stage, John, but not Eugene, is in a position to know that C is true
rather than false. Eugene can choose whether or not to enter the laboratory to
try to nd out whether C is true.
Suppose Eugene decides to see for himself the outcome of Johns observation
by entering the laboratory just after tf . This will decohere the phase of j E(tf )i,
permitting Eugene to apply the Born Rule to this state to adjust his degrees of
belief in various signicant claims about the contents of the laboratory, including
C, Johns record of the outcome in his notebook, Johns verbal report, etc. as
well as correlations between such claims. The Born probabilities of these claims
(joint as well as single) based on the state j E(tf )i will lead him to the following
condent expectation: whatever may be the outcome of Johns observation, the
laboratory will contain multiple mutually supporting records of it. Nothing
about j E(tf )i will tell him what Johns outcome actually was. But he can
easily nd that out by asking John and observing any of the other multiple,
correlated records inside the laboratory. The important point is that j E(tf )i
does not exclude an outcome at tf , so by entering the laboratory Eugene simply
nds out what happened he does not make it happen.
If Eugene were instead (able) to remain outside the laboratory but interact
with it so as to measure the value of O, he should use j E(tf )i to calculate a
Born probability of 1 that a suitable recording device, applied to the laboratory
and decohered in its "pointer basis" by external environmental interactions,
will record a value of O equal to the eigenvalue of its corresponding operator
in state j E(tf )i. Even though Eugene assumes that John records the outcome
of his measurement at tf , by tf there has been no physical interaction between
Eugene and anything inside the laboratory that could serve to inform Eugene
of that outcome. So Eugene cannot base his expectation of the outcome of
a measurement of O on j J(tf )i, and would be mistaken if he were to base
that expectation on J(tf ). There is no ambiguity about to what state Eugene
should apply the Born Rule when setting his credences concerning the outcome
of his O measurement.
On what quantum state should John base his credence as to the outcome
of an external O-measurement? The outcome of Johns measurement should
prompt him to update the quantum state he assigns to certain subsystems of
his laboratory so as to take account of the new information he has acquired.
For example, since he takes C not only to have a high content at and for some
time after tf but also to be true then (based on his own observation of D),
his state assignment to D should reect this. So he should not only believe
C but also assign D a quantum state that assigns Born probablity 1 to C
the state jmi, an eigenstate of M^ with eigenvalue m (or, more realistically, a
mixture of degenerate eigenstates with this eigenvalue). This is how he squares
the inferences to which C entitles him that repeated observations of D will
conrm the continued truth of C with credences based on application of the
Born rule to the quantum state he assigns to D.
He may go on to assign quantum state j'mi jmi to s+D if he has justied
condence that the interaction has not disturbed s, since his expectations based
on that state would then be borne out, even concerning measurements in his
laboratory of correlations between dynamical variables on s and D. That will
be so only because phase relations between the states of s and of D have been
delocalized by their environment within the laboratory. But if he were to con-
sider the entire contents of his laboratory, he would have to acknowledge that
the outcome of an external O-measurement by Eugene on this vast composite
system would be sensitive to phase relations between its subsystems that have
not been decohered by any environmental interactions, since (by hypothesis)
there has been no interaction between the laboratory and its external environ-
ment. So he would be mistaken to base his credence as to the outcome of an
external O-measurement on assignment of state j J(tf )i to the entire system
these compose. He can hypothetically take the perspective of Eugene, but if he
does so he must then assign the same state j E(tf )i that he agrees is the cor-
rect state for someone in Eugenes situation. There is no ambiguity as to which
quantum state should be used to calculate Born probabilities for the results of
an external O-measurement performed on the entire laboratory, in the sense
that di¤erently positioned agents (John and Eugene, in this case) agree on this
state. Of course, only Eugene is then in a position to make such a measurement.
What will Eugene nd if he enters the laboratory after measuring the value
of O in this way? D will no longer have a record of the truth of C. Even
if John still exists, he will not remember that C was veried as true at tf .
Because O^ fails to commute with M^ , as well as each operator corresponding
to an e¤ective "pointer observable" on every other system correlated with this
through interactions within the laboratory, the external interaction required to
record the value of O will have so disturbed the laboratory and its contents as
to remove all traces that C was true at tf . But one cant change the past: C
was indeed true at tf , as John then veried with his own eyes.
There is, in principle, an even more dramatic way to erase all traces of
C. Since the entire laboratory and its contents constitutes an isolated system,
Eugene will take j Ei to have evolved unitarily from its state j E(ti)i prior to
Johns measurement on s to its state j E(tf )i = Uif j E(ti)i. The state Eugene
should ascribe to the contents of the laboratory at ti should reect his belief
that his friend has not yet performed the planned measurement: this will assign
Born probability 1 to claims about D, John and other items in the laboratory
that su¢ ces to substantiate this full belief. Mathematically, there will exist a
Hamiltonian that would induce the time-reversed evolution of j Ei so that at
a later time tg(where tg   tf = tf   ti) it is restored to its value before Johns
measurement: j E(tg)i = Uyfg j E(tf )i = j E(ti)i.
If Eugene had the powers of a quantum demon, he could instantaneously re-
place the original Hamiltonian by this time-reversing Hamiltonian at tf , thereby
restoring j Ei at tg to its original value at ti. Suppose that he does so, and
postpones his entry into the laboratory until tg. Since the quantum state of the
entire laboratory is identical to what it was before John had made any measure-
ment, Eugene must fully expect that if he then asks John about the result of
his measurement, John will say he has not yet performed any measurement. He
must further fully expect that his own examination at, and at any time after,
tg of D, Johns notebook, and anything else inside the laboratory will reveal
no record of any such measurement ever having been made. Eugenes action at
tf has, by tg, erased all traces of Johns measurement and its result: Indeed,
Eugene has succeeded in erasing all traces of everything that happened inside
the laboratory between ti and tf . Once again, he has not changed the past. But
there has been a wholesale loss of history, understood as reliable information
about the past. This point will be pursued in the concluding discussion. The
present section has shown how the pragmatist view of Healey (2012) maintains
the objectivity of physical description in the Wigners friend scenario.
6 Objectivity Secured
According to Healey (2012), John inside the laboratory and Eugene outside
do not assign inconsistent truth-values to claim C. Moreover, each assigns the
same rich content to C based on the decoherence of the state of s+D induced
by environmental interactions inside the laboratory. This certies the (fourth
aspect of the) objectivity of C in the Wigners friend scenario: John and Eugene
agree not only on the truth-value but also on the content of claim C, despite
their di¤erent physical situations. The certication depends on the fact that
both John and Eugene apply essentially the same model of decoherence to the
same initial quantum state of s+D.
But there is an objection to be faced. According to Healey (2012), while
quantum states are objective they are also relational: the quantum state an
agent should assign to a system generally depends on the (actual or hypothet-
ical) physical situation of that agent. If di¤erently situated agents assign dif-
ferent quantum states to a system, this raises the possibility that their models
of its decoherence will so di¤er as to lead each to assign a di¤erent content to
certain claims concerning it. Relativization of quantum state ascriptions threat-
ens relativization of the content of NQMCs like C. This would undermine their
objectivity in the fourth respect pointed out in section 2.
Now even though John and Eugene are di¤erently situated in the Wigners
friend scenario, each can choose to adopt the perspective of the others situation
for the purpose of applying quantum theory. Eugene should assign the same
initial state as John to s because each knows that this is the state on which John
will perform his measurement. Eugene and John are each in the same state of
ignorance as to the initial state of D and its (lack of) correlations with that
of s, so there is no reason for them to assign di¤erent states either to D alone
or to s+D. (Their conclusion that interactions within the laboratory robustly
decohere the state of s+D and so endow C with rich content is not sensitive
to ne details of the initial state of s+D.)
One might object that Eugenes physical situation requires him to assign the
state j Ei to the contents of the laboratory, and that since the phase of j Ei is
not delocalized into its environment Eugene should not assign a rich content to
C. An alternative objection would be that C has no unambiguous content for
Eugene, since he has no principled reason to base his assessment of that content
on the degree of decoherence of the "internal" state of s+D rather than that of
j Ei.
But in assessing the content of an NQMC such as C about a system (D in this
case), an agent like Eugene should base his model of decoherence on quantum
state assignments incorporating everything he is in a position to know about
the physical situation of D, as represented in non-quantum claims. We have
assumed that Eugene is in a position to know that John will initiate a certain
interaction between s and D inside the laboratory. Eugenes physical situation
does not require him to assign the state j Ei to the contents of the laboratory
when assessing the content of C : to do so would be to neglect information to
which he has access in this situation that is relevant to assignment of quantum
states to s and D.
There are circumstances in which agents are so di¤erently situated that
they correctly assign di¤erent quantum states to the same system, where each
agents assignment is based on all information to which the agent has access,
given her physical situation.10 If models of decoherence based on such di¤erent
assignments were to result in these agents assigning di¤erent contents to the
same NQMC, that could threaten the objectivity of description in quantum
theory. To assess the threat we need to specify how far di¤erent agentsstate
assignments may di¤er, and how this a¤ects the models of decoherence they
should employ in assessing the content of relevant NQMCs.
The example in footnote 10 prompts the following restriction on di¤erent
agents state assignments: If Alice assigns a mixed state to a system while
Bob assigns a pure state, then Bobs state vector lies in the support of Alices
density matrix. An argument for a generalization of this restriction has been
o¤ered (Brun et al. 2002): Di¤erent agentsstate assignments by several density
10This happens, for example, when Alice and Bob perform spacelike separated polariza-
tion measurements on an entangled photon pair. Knowing his outcome, Bob can assign a
polarization eigenstate to the photon entering Alices detector. Since this information is not
accessible to Alice, she correctly assigns that photon a mixed polarization state.
matrices are mutually compatible if and only if the supports of all of them have
a least one vector in common.
Suppose di¤erently situated agents (such as Alice and Bob in the example)
assign quantum states to a system S that di¤er in some way consistent with this
generalized restriction. Assuming this is the only di¤erence between the models
of decoherence they use in assessing the content of NQMCs about S, there are no
grounds for thinking they will arrive at di¤erent assessments. By assumption,
all their models share the generic features of applying the same Hamiltonians
to the same initial state of Ss environment with the same limitations on prior
system/environment entanglement. Since a model with these generic features
will decohere the phase of a generic pure state of S to the same extent in the
same "basis"11 , that is how it will model the decoherence of every vector in the
Hilbert space in which lies the vector common to the supports of all the states
assigned by di¤erently situated agents subject to the generalized restriction. It
follows that the model of decoherence each of these agents uses to assess the
content of NQMCs about S will lead each agent to the same assessment of the
contents of NQMCs about S. This means they will all agree on the content of
these NQMCs, thereby securing their objectivity in the fourth respect noted in
section 4.
11The scare quotes mark the need to allow for models in which decoherence e¤ectively
"diagonalizes" ss density operator in an overcomplete basis of narrow Gaussian states.
7 Independent Veriability
It is ironic that observation poses a threat to the objectivity of physical descrip-
tion in quantum theory, since observation is generally used to settle questions
about objectivity in science and daily life. Doubting the objective presence of
the dagger he saw, Macbeth tried to grasp it: to prove that Banquos ghost
occupied his own place at table, he pleaded his guests to see for themselves.
Classical physics permits multiple, independent observations on a system to
verify a claim about its state, since none of these need irremediably disturb
that state.
But suppose an individual system is in a wholly unknown quantum state. No
single observation on it can reliably disclose its state. Repeated observations are
no better, since observing a system typically irreparably disturbs its quantum
state. So even if a systems wholly unknown quantum state could be ascertained
by a single observation, this nding could not be checked in further observations,
either by the original agent or by others. A wholly unknown quantum state of
an individual system is not as objective as a corresponding classical state in
yet another, epistemic, sense: it is not independently veriable. Ollivier et al.
(2004) put the point like this: "The key feature distinguishing the classical realm
from the quantum substrate is its objective existence."
They propose what they call an operational denition of objectivity for a
property of a quantum system, according to which such a property is simulta-
neously accessible to many observers who are able to nd out what it is without
prior knowledge and who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agree-
ment. Their idea is that such a property is objective to the extent that multiple
records of it exist in separate portions of the environment, so that observers
probing fractions of the environment can act as if the system had a state of its
own an objective state.They say that "The existence of an objective property
requires the presence of its complete and redundant imprint in the environment
as necessary and su¢ cient conditions".
While Ollivier et al. (2004) never say exactly what they mean by a property,
it seems clear they would count an NQMC locating a value in  of a magnitude
M on system S as a property assignment to S.
The state of a system in classical physics is specied by a point in phase
space: this is equivalent to an assignment of a value to each magnitude on that
system, i.e. an assignment of a property locating that value in a unit set. The
authorsstand-in for the objective state of an open quantum system is one of the
eigenvectors of the system observable corresponding to the pointer magnitude
that is selected by environmental decoherence. An NQMC locating a value in 
to the pointer magnitude on system S is taken to assign S an objective property
solely on the grounds that a complete and redundant imprint is present in the
environment. There are other magnitudes on S represented by operators each
of whose eigenvectors is close to an eigenvector of the pointer observable. An
NQMC locating a value in  to such a magnitude on system S also counts as
assigning S a reasonably objective property because of a complete and (slightly
less) redundant imprint in the environment. Their idea seems to be that the
proliferation of imprints of properties of a quantum system in its environment
progressively objecties its properties until these come to mimic properties that
characterize a classical state. An eigenvector of the pointer observable stands in
for an objective state by specifying what properties of the system are objectied
by the environmental interactions to which it is subjected. "...amplication of
a preferred observable happens almost as inevitably as decoherence, and leads
to objective classical reality".
This is Quantum Darwinism: "the idea that the perceived classical reality
is a consequence of the selective proliferation of information about the system".
It is not an account of classical reality, or of the actual objective state of a
quantum system. If I have understood it correctly, it is an account of how inde-
pendent acts of observation on a systems environment can produce consensus
on properties of a quantum system irrespective of whether or not that system
has such properties. One is reminded of Wittgensteins remark in his Philosoph-
ical Investigations: "As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning
paper to assure himself that what it said was true".
Wittgensteins avid reader is actually in better shape than multiple quantum
observers. The morning paper may have correctly reported what happened.
But if no NQMCs about a quantum system are true then it lacks the properties
observers attribute to it, so whatever proliferates is in fact misinformation. It
is important not to be misled by the causal language of imprints into thinking
that objective properties of the environment are caused by objective properties
of a decohered quantum system. As it stands, Quantum Darwinism (Ollivier et
al. 2004) fails to provide an adequate account of objectivity in the sense of the
independent veriability of NQMCs because it does nothing to show how either
those NQMCs or claims about their environmental imprints can be objectively
true, given the quantum states of system and environment. Groupthink does
not amount to intersubjective verication. But the pragmatist view of Healey
(2012) can help the Quantum Darwinist take this crucial last step: and after he
has taken it, he can be recruited as an ally in the common cause of securing the
objectivity of quantum description. The contribution of Quantum Darwinism
is then its account of how NQMCs that are already objectively true can come
to be widely known, even when they concern extraordinarily sensitive physical
systems.
Decoherence endows certain NQMCs with a signicant content that requires
even di¤erently situated agents to seek agreement on their truth-values. When
a system is decohered by its environment, these will include claims about the
value of its pointer magnitude. They will also include claims about magnitudes
on subsystems of the environment that are correlated with the systems pointer
magnitude. Since properties not only of the system but also of subsystems of
its environment are in this sense objective, it makes sense to ask whether objec-
tive claims about a system can be independently veried by observing various
portions of its environment. Quantum Darwinism may now o¤er illuminating
answers to this question by providing quantum models of interactions between
a quantum system and its multipartite environment. This is a way to show how
di¤erently situated agents can come to agree on the truth-values of signicant
NQMCs about a system without disturbing its state.
8 Conclusion
Reection on the paradox of Wigners friend has persuaded some people that
quantum theory cannot be understood without careful attention to the role of
conscious human experience (Wigner 1967, DEspagnat 2005). But a pragmatist
interpretation (Healey 2012) permits a consistent and unambiguous treatment
of the paradox without reference to consciousness. Situated agents can use
quantum theory to make objective claims about the values of magnitudes in
the physical world, not just about observations of them. This has helped us to
predict and explain an enormous variety of otherwise puzzling physical phenom-
ena. A true claim about the value of a physical magnitude states an objective
physical fact. Ordinarily, such facts are readily independently veriable. But
acceptance of quantum theory requires one to countenance the possibility that in
extraordinary circumstances information about the value of a magnitude could
be irretrievably erased, making this fact no longer veriable.12
A canonical magnitude claim ascribes an objective property to a physical
system. But the content of this claim is a function of the environmental con-
text. One is tempted to say that this makes the property ascribed not intrinsic
but relational, though an inferentialist view of content should make one suspi-
cious of this distinction. In the case of quantum eld theory, it implies that any
12 I thank a referee for correctly pointing out that this consequence is not peculiar to
quantum theory. Classical physics also allows for the (in principle) possibility of rewriting
history (e.g. by restoring the exact local situation prior to the melting of an ice-cube in a
glass of water).
claim about particles has a well-dened content only in some contexts, while
other contexts give signicance to a claim about (classical) elds. In assessing
the content of a claim, an agent should consider the nature and extent of en-
vironmental delocalization of coherence. This content does not depend on the
(actual or hypothetical) physical situation of the agent, even when agents base
their assessments on the di¤erent quantum states appropriate to their di¤erent
physical (and therefore epistemic) situations.
Science is based on observed facts, and quantum theory is no exception.
According to Healey (2012), what makes quantum theory exceptional is what it
teaches us about the nature of these facts. Bell (2004, 41) introduced the term
beablebecause he thought "it should be possible to say of a system not that
such and such may be observed to be so but that such and such be so".
When making a signicant claim about the value of a magnitude on a quan-
tum system one is saying that it be so, according to Healey (2012). Perhaps
this makes this magnitude a beable in Bells sense. But Bell (2004, 52) goes
on to say: "the beables ... can be described "in classical terms", because they
are there. The beables must include the settings of switches and knobs on ex-
perimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments":
and (Bell 2004, 174) "The beables of the theory are those elements which might
correspond to elements of reality, to things which exist".
These passages at least suggest that acceptance of quantum theory in no
way modies the content of claims about values of magnitudes a content that
is somehow established by a xed representation relation that obtains between
language and the world (actual, or merely possible if a beable be not)! A
pragmatist cannot accept such a representational account of how content accrues
to a claim (Brandom 1994, 2000). According to the pragmatist interpretation
of Healey (2012), to understand quantum theory one needs instead to adopt an
alternative inferentialist account of what gives a claim content. By modifying
the inferential relations between magnitude claims, quantum theory a¤ects their
content, rendering this contextual. By making the content of a magnitude claim
about a system a function of the environment, acceptance of quantum theory
cautions one against taking that claim to attribute an intrinsic property to
a non-contextually existing object, even while insisting on the objectivity of
the claim. This should make one think di¤erently even about the content of
everyday claims about ordinary things like the settings of switches and knobs on
experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments.
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